Harvard University Press Blog

When States Decay

Continuing our election-season series of consulting with the Classics, we turn today to Polybius, and the brief conclusion to his “Treatise on the Roman Republic,” as offered in Book 6 of The Histories, contained in Loeb Classical Library Volume 138. This translation, published in 2011, is a thorough revision of W. R. Paton’s 1922 text.

-----

That all existing things are subject to decay and change is a truth that scarcely needs proof; for the course of nature is sufficient to force this conviction on us. There being two agencies by which every kind of state is liable to decay, the one external and the other a growth of the state itself, we can lay down no fixed rule about the former, but the latter is a regular process. I have already stated what kind of state is the first to come into being, and what the next, and how the one is transformed into the other; so that those who are capable of connecting the opening propositions of this inquiry with its conclusion will now be able to foretell the future unaided. And what will happen is, I think, evident. When a state has weathered many great perils and subsequently attains to supremacy and uncontested sovereignty, it is evident that under the influence of long established prosperity, life becomes more extravagant and the citizens more fierce in their rivalry regarding office and other objects than they ought to be. As these defects go on increasing, the beginning of the change for the worse will be due to love of office and the disgrace entailed by obscurity, as well as to extravagance and purse-proud display; and for this change the populace will be responsible when on the one hand they think they have a grievance against certain people who have shown themselves grasping, and when, on the other hand, they are puffed up by the flattery of others who aspire to office. For now, stirred to fury and swayed by passion in all their counsels, they will no longer consent to obey or even to be the equals of the ruling caste, but will demand the lion’s share for themselves. When this happens, the state will change its name to the finest sounding of all, freedom and democracy, but will change its nature to the worst thing of all, mob rule.

What Can Mitt Romney and Barack Obama Learn from the Ancient Greeks?

In his new book Loving Humanity, Learning, and Being Honored (published by Harvard’s Center for Hellenic Studies), Howard University professor Norman B. Sandridge discusses the timeless ideals of leadership in Greek historian Xenophon’s work Cyropaedia (Education of Cyrus). In Cyropaedia, written in 4th century BC, Xenophon presents a fictionalized account of a real historical figure, Persian king Cyrus the Great. Politicians throughout history have embraced Xenophon’s model of leading with attention to humanity, learning, and honor, and we asked Sandridge about the lessons available to voters and candidates today.

-----

Q: You write that the Education of Cyrus captured the interest of Plato, Cicero, Machiavelli, and Jefferson, among others. Why do you think these leaders read this work?

Many people, ancient and modern, read the Education of Cyrus because it is full of amusing and enlightening stories about leadership. What does a great leader look like as a kid? How do you train leaders? Can leaders have wild, romantic passion and still benefit their followers? How should leaders treat their rivals? Why do people follow leaders? These are all questions that ancient theorists wrestled with, but Xenophon did us a favor by casting them in a narrative form. In the ancient world Greeks and Romans thought that one of the best ways to become a better person was to contemplate and then emulate the examples of great people. The fact that Xenophon’s Cyrus was a historical figure gave readers an even greater sense of what was possible not only in theory but in practice.

Q: What are Xenophon’s major pieces of advice for politicians, and what specific advice do you think he would give to today’s presidential hopefuls?

I think Xenophon’s first lesson would be, “look outside of your own culture for inspiration.” When Xenophon wrote the Education of Cyrus, the Greeks had been fighting wars with the Persians for well over one hundred years. These wars turned out to be as much military as cultural; Persians were often seen as either deficient or hyperbolic of everything it meant to be Greek. And yet Xenophon looked to the example of Cyrus to theorize about the best kind of leadership. In part this was because Xenophon himself had served with Persians on campaign and had personal admiration for their prince, Cyrus the Younger. But also I think Xenophon found it liberating to think outside of his own culture.

By contrast, ever since September 11th, we have witnessed a disappointing trend in chauvinism in America (more positively cast as “American exceptionalism”), which no major politician seems to be able to escape. In so many other fields like art, math, science, and engineering, we recognize that progress is achieved only with global collaboration and imagination. How liberating for the American psyche would it be to hear President Obama or Governor Romney express a fondness for an ancient Iranian king like Cyrus!

Secondly, I think Xenophon would tell any potential politician that leadership is a lifetime intellectual and ethical pursuit—not something learned as an afterthought to other previous ambitions. As Xenophon conceives of it, young Persians go to school to learn the moral virtues they will need to lead their community, virtues like gratitude, justice, self-restraint, and mastery over hunger, thirst, and sleep.

Finally, I think Xenophon would also remind us, and our politicians, that a good community is a prerequisite to good leadership. Cyrus grows up in a Persia whose members are as trained in civic virtue as he is, even if he turns out to be the greatest practitioner of it. When he speaks to them about their interests, he is doing so from a shared set of values. Thus, if we want better leaders, we must strive to be better people ourselves.

Principles of Democracy

Throughout this American election season we’ll be sharing some of the many gems of political commentary on offer in the Loeb Classical Library. And where better to start than with the following passage on the features common to democracies, excerpted from Book VI of Aristotle’s Politics, LCL volume 264?

-----

Now a fundamental principle of the democratic form of constitution is liberty—that is what is usually asserted, implying that only under this constitution do men participate in liberty, for they assert this as the aim of every democracy. But one factor of liberty is to govern and be governed in turn; for the popular principle of justice is to have equality according to number, not worth, and if this is the principle of justice prevailing, the multitude must of necessity be sovereign and the decision of the majority must be final and must constitute justice, for they say that each of the citizens ought to have an equal share; so that it results that in democracies the poor are more powerful than the rich, because there are more of them and whatever is decided by the majority is sovereign. This then is one mark of liberty which all democrats set down as a principle of the constitution.

And one is for a man to live as he likes; for they say that this is the function of liberty, inasmuch as to live not as one likes is the life of a man that is a slave. This is the second principle of democracy, and from it has come the claim not to be governed, preferably not by anybody, or failing that, to govern and be governed in turns; and this is the way in which the second principle contributes to equalitarian liberty. And these principles having been laid down and this being the nature of democratic government, the following institutions are democratic in character: election of officials by all from all; government of each by all, and of all by each in turn; election by lot either to all magistracies or to all that do not need experience and skill; no property-qualification for office, or only a very low one; no office to be held twice, or more than a few times, by the same person, or few offices except the military ones; short tenure either of all offices or of as many as possible; judicial functions to be exercised by all citizens, that is by persons selected from all, and on all matters, or on most and the greatest and most important, for instance the audit of official accounts, constitutional questions, private contracts; the assembly to be sovereign over all matters, but no official over any or only over extremely few; or else a council to be sovereign over the most important matters (and a council is the most democratic of magistracies in states where there is not a plentiful supply of pay for everybody—for where there is, they deprive even this office of its power, since the people draws all the trials to itself when it has plenty of pay, as has been said before in the treatise preceding this one; also payment for public duties, preferably in all branches, assembly, law-courts, magistracies, or if not, for the magistracies, the law-courts, council and sovereign assemblies, or for those magistracies which are bound to have common mess-tables. Also inasmuch as oligarchy is defined by birth, wealth and education, the popular qualifications are thought to be the opposite of these, low birth, poverty, vulgarity. And in respect of the magistracies it is democratic to have none tenable for life, and if any life-office has been left after an ancient revolution, at all events to deprive it of its power and to substitute election by lot for election by vote.

These then are the features common to democracies. But what is thought to be the extreme form of democracy and of popular government comes about as a result of the principle of justice that is admitted to be democratic, and this is for all to have equality according to number. For it is equality for the poor to have no larger share of power than the rich, and not for the poor alone to be supreme but for all to govern equally; for in this way they would feel that the constitution possessed both equality and liberty. But the question follows, how will they have equality? are the property-assessments of five hundred citizens to be divided among a thousand and the thousand to have equal power to the five hundred? or is equality on this principle not to be arranged in this manner, but the division into classes to be on this system, but then an equal number to be taken from the five hundred and from the thousand and these to control the elections and the law-courts? Is this then the justest form of constitution in accordance with popular justice, or is it rather one that goes by counting heads? For democrats say that justice is whatever seems good to the larger number, but advocates of oligarchy think that it is whatever seems good to the owners of the larger amount of property, for they say that the decision ought to go by amount of property. But both views involve inequality and injustice; for if the will of the few is to prevail, this means a tyranny, since if one man owns more than the other rich men, according to the oligarchic principle of justice it is just for him to rule alone; whereas if the will of the numerical majority is to prevail, they will do injustice by confiscating the property of the rich minority, as has been said before. What form of equality therefore would be one on which both parties will agree must be considered in the light of the principles of justice as defined by both sets. For they say that whatever seems good to the majority of the citizens ought to be sovereign. Let us then accept this principle, yet not wholly without qualification, but inasmuch as fortune has brought into existence two component parts of the state, rich and poor, let any resolution passed by both classes, or by a majority of each, be sovereign, but if the two classes carry opposite resolutions, let the decision of the majority, in the sense of the group whose total property-assessment is the larger, prevail: for instance, if there are ten rich citizens and twenty poor ones, and opposite votes have been cast by six of the rich on one side and by fifteen of the less wealthy on the other, four of the rich have sided with the poor and five of the poor with the rich; then the side that has the larger total property when the assessments of both classes on either side are added together carries the voting. But if the totals fall out exactly equal, this is to be deemed an impasse common to both sides, as it is at present if the assembly or law-court is exactly divided; either a decision must be made by casting lots or some other such device must be adopted. But on questions of equality and justice, even though it is very difficult to discover the truth about them, nevertheless it is easier to hit upon it than to persuade people that have the power to get an advantage to agree to it; equality and justice are always sought by the weaker party, but those that have the upper hand pay no attention to them.